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Introduction 
Introduction of genetically modified (GM) crops is the most important innovation 
in modern agriculture that promises more benefits than it has delivered. Biotechnology 
provides significant consumer and producer benefits, the magnitude and distribution of 
which depends critically on the structure of the markets via which the innovation effects 
are realized. While some agricultural markets are undoubtedly competitive, some are not. 
The object of our simulation is the U.S. soybean market in which growers sell most of 
their produce to the soybean processing and exporting industry (Larson, 1998). In the last 
twenty years, the industry has become significantly more concentrated than most other 
U.S. food processing industries. At present, four largest firms own about 80 percent of 
total capacity. The real value of the crush margin has increased from about $0.5 in the 
1960s and 70s to almost $1.4 in the 1990s (Soya and Oilseed Bluebook, 2000), while the 
breakeven level in crushing was estimated to be only 15 cents in the 1980s (Shaub et al., 
1988). These data suggest that there might exist an oligopsony in the U.S. soybean 
market. The other imperfectly competitive market in the chain is the GM soybean seed 
market, which is an institutionalized monopoly. The markets for soymeal and soyoil, 
however, are competitive (Deodhar and Sheldon, 1997).  
In this paper, we develop a dynamic model of adoption of GM soybean 
technology under the assumption of imperfect competition in the soybean processing 
market. The model also accommodates identity preservation requirements that imply 
segregation of soybeans at all stages of production and distribution. The model is 
specified as a Nash oligoposony situation where players with market power (the 
processing companies) make their output and pricing decisions under certain incentive         2  
 
compatibility constraints and act strategically. Assumptions of the model are chosen to 
reflect the industry and market facts.  
We use the model to evaluate market and distributional effects of partial adoption 
of GM soybeans in the United States. Our approach is innovative because, unlike other 
recent models of agricultural innovation (Buckwell, 1999; Moschini et al., 2000), it 
assumes oligopsony in the soybean market and crop segregation. While specified for the 
soybean-processing complex, our model is also applicable to other GM crop markets and 
it improves understanding of the diffusion process of agricultural innovations. 
  In section 1, we discuss the mechanism of diffusion of agricultural innovation 
among the growers. In section 2, we review the literature on dynamic oligopoly and lay 
out the model of GM soybeans adoption. Calibration data are shown in section 3. In 
section 4, we present and discuss the simulation results. Section 5 concludes. 
 
1.  The Mechanism of Diffusion.  
Diffusion of technological innovations can be considered a separate branch of 
economics. The literature on the subject is voluminous. Within the subject, the theories 
can be classified as: 
•  Intra-firm theories of diffusion: Stoneman (1983, 1987), Mansfield (1968); 
•  Intra-sectoral diffusion theories: David (1975), Grilliches (1957, 1980), 
Dixon (1980), Mansfield (1968); 
•  Game-theoretic approach: Reinganum (1981); 
•  Economy-wide diffusion: Schumpeter , Davies(1979).         3  
 
In our opinion, the model that best suits adoption of innovation by agricultural 
producers is that of partial equilibrium, or probit model, according to the terminology 
used by Stoneman (1983) and David (1975). This approach states that the diffusion (i.e. 
adoptions scattered along time) arises from the unequal distribution of certain key 
characteristics of business entities or adopters that are decisive for adoption. Firms have 
the same information about the new technology (not necessarily complete), but not the 
same ability or potential profitability to use it at a given point of time. In a general case, it 
is the changes in profitability of the new technology, be it changes in the price of new 
inputs, new equipment, new product output, or a combination of them that are the engine 
of adoption. Firms are regarded as displaying the same rational behavior when faced with 
similar information, though submitted to different constraints as they do not share the 
same production conditions or are not positioned on the same markets. Davies (1979) has 
pointed out the major importance of firm size for introducing innovations. The most 
important feature of this approach is that the incentive from outside is the same for all 
firms, but the time of adoption differs because of the firms’ heterogeneity.
1  
In the standard probit model of innovation behavior by firms, a firm i  with a 
vector of characteristics zi adopts the new technology at time t if and only if  
t i p r z h ≥ / ) ( , where, h is the difference in profitability of the innovated technology with 
respect to the existing technology, r is the discount rate;  h/r is the present value of the 
gain brought by the use of the new technology, and pt is the cost of acquisition of the new 
technology at time t.    
                                                 
1 Actually, this model uses the same logic as basic microeconomic model of upward sloping supply (or 
downward sloping demand) – both derive the results from the heterogeneity of population.          4  
 
Stoneman concludes that, as long as the price of the innovated technology pt 
declines over time, the number of adopters increases. The implicit assumption of perfect 
competition and no strategic interaction among the adopters justifies the results.  
The fall in price of the new equipment can stem from various sources in the 
industries of the innovation suppliers: learning by doing, incremental technical progress, 
and increasing returns to scale. This scheme of diffusion determines the number of firms 
using the new technology once p(t) and the distribution law of the characteristics of the 
firms are known. If zt is the characteristic of the marginal adopter at time t, h(zt) = rpt . If 
F is the cumulative distribution function of N firms constituting the industry with respect 
to zt, then the number of users of the new technology is equal to Mt = N(1 – F(zt)). If F 
has the normal distribution, the law of diffusion will be S-shaped. If F itself is a logistic 
distribution, as in the epidemiological models, it will be strictly a logistic curve. The 
diffusion rate, i.e. the penetration level Mt as a share of the whole population of firms, 
finally depends on the rate of evolution of price p for a given distribution of characteristic 
z.  
Many indicators of heterogeneity among firms have been used in empirical tests of 
this standard probit model, for example the mean wage rate as a proxy for the 
qualification of the labor force (David, 1969), the ratio of indirect to direct labor which 
measures both the ability to handle new equipment and the interest to invest in labor 
saving equipment (Antonelli and Tahar, 1990), and the level of growth of sales 
(Benvignati, 1982).  
Considering diffusion of GM crops, in particular soybeans, the primary adopters are 
the agricultural producers as it is their profit function that is affected by the GM         5  
 
technology. The sources of farmers’ heterogeneity relevant to the profitability of GM 
soybeans are as follows: 
-  The level of weed infestation. GM soybeans provide cost savings to the growers 
because of their resistance to glyphosate – a powerful herbicide. The more weed 
infestation an agricultural producer faces, the more cost benefits GM soybeans 
offer. Weed infestation is a more urgent issue in the southern soybean growing 
regions than in the Midwest and in the North. It is likely that GM soybean 
varieties are more profitable in the Southern growing regions. 
-  The level of farm income. There is some level of risk associated with GM crops. 
The sources of the risk are numerous, ranging from potential hazards GM crops 
impose on other crops to the public attitude towards GM foods. The incentive to 
adopt a GM crop is inversely related to its riskiness. When some risk is present 
(i.e., it is uncertain what the price will be, so that there is some expectation but 
relatively high variance), the farmers with higher income would react to the 
expected differences in profitability more readily than the farmers with low 
income.
2 Related producer characteristics are the stock of machinery, storage 
capacities, farm size, level of diversification of activities, and other factors that 
affect a farm's financial stability.  
-  Contractual relations with buyers or suppliers. If a farmer has entered a contract 
with a buyer or supplier (a seed company), she is more restricted in her 
production choices. Depending on the price she gets by the contract, she might be 
more or less willing to take the risk and plant GM crop.  
                                                 
2Theoretically, the utility function is always concave so that the level of risk aversion decreases with 
wealth.          6  
 
A straightforward development of the standard probit model supposes that firms’ 
decisions are not simply linked to the current prices, but also to some expectation 
concerning these prices in the future (Stoneman, 1987). Firms can effectively anticipate 
falls in prices if they presume some diffusion to take place. The behavioral equation is 
then modified to  
) ( ) ( 1
e
t t t i p p rp z h + − + ≥ ,   or 
e
t t i p p r z h 1 ) 1 ( ) ( + − + ≥ . 
In the case of agricultural producers facing the opportunity to plant GM crops, it 
is usually not the costs of the new technology that vary in time, but the growers’ output 
prices. It is reasonable to assume that agricultural producers (soybean growers), unlike 
bigger business entities, are restricted in the ability to anticipate future prices. One of the 
more plausible assumptions is that of adaptive expectations. In particular, making next 
year’s planting decisions and facing the general uncertainty about GM crops, the growers 
consider both the crop’s profitability and this year’s price change. It is also likely that 
agricultural producers generally do not have to commit to GM crops in the future once 
they’ve planted them. A producer will, therefore, plant GM crop if  
) ( ) ( 1 i i t t t z c c w w w + ≥ − + − β , 
where wt is the price of GM crop,  i c  is the cost of growing traditional varieties, and 
) ( i z c  is the cost saving from GM technology. β  is the weight attached to the 
significance of the adaptive expectation of the next year’s price. 0<β <1 and it must be 
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negatively correlated with the uncertainty about GM crops. β  can also be related to the 
growers’ heterogeneity. For the purposes of the model, we assumeβ  to be constant.  
Transforming the inequality above gives us the condition for adoption by a 












,   or 
1 ) 1 ( )) ( ( − − + + = t i i t w s z c c s w ,   0 < s < 1. 
It is easy to show that, given GM soybeans provide some cost savings, the GM 
soybean inverse short-run supply function is  
1 ) 1 ( ) ( − − + = t t t w s Q sw w , 
where  w(Qt)  is the long-run (time invariant) supply function that depends on the 
profitability of the GM crop and on the heterogeneity of the producers in the 
characteristics that affect the GM crop’s profitability. Taking a linear approximation, 
1 ) 1 ( ) ( − − + + = t t t w s bQ a s w . 
It can be shown that, given GM soybeans provide some cost savings,  
N b b >  and 
N a a < , where the superscripts N denote coefficients of the traditional (Non-





N Q b a w + =  which is not dependent on expectations 
because the situation with the traditional crops is much more certain. 
 
This reasoning is similar to the assumption of sticky prices: the process of diffusion is 
state dependent and the state is the price. The GM crop price is, in our opinion, the best 
candidate for the state variable, because it immediately affects the growers’ planting 
decisions.          8  
 
Now, the bulk of raw soybeans is purchased by the soybean processors or 
exporters represented by the same companies who are assumed to know the short and 
long-run supply functions. The buyers do not set prices but rather quantities.
3 There is 
voluminous literature on price discovery, particularly in agricultural markets. The general 
opinion is that the prices efficiently reflect the supply and demand conditions.  
  When the processing industry is an oligopsony, it is the behavior of the processing 
companies that, together with the supply conditions, determines the time path of the input 
prices and hence the paths and levels of GM soybean adoption. We thus model the 
diffusion process as a dynamic oligopoly game with the agricultural producers’ adoption 
behavior described as above.    
 
2.  The Model of Adoption 
Existing dynamic oligopoly models typically accommodate some index of market 
power, which includes three leading market structures: perfect competition, non-
cooperative Nash, and the cartel/monopoly behavior. The index is designed to describe 
rather than explain the market outcome - it is an assumption about how the firms react to 
each other’s actions. Different indices can be consistent with the same equilibria (i.e., a 
non-cooperative equilibrium may be identical to the perfect competition or to a cartel 
solution). The index enters the model as a parameter, v that reflects the markup of price 
over marginal cost. In this approach, given the demand (for oligopoly) or supply 
                                                 
3 The two products in question (GM and traditional soybeans) are homogeneous, and there is little reason 
to believe that producers would completely specialize in either GM or traditional soybeans (the elevators 
and plants of every big producer are scattered around all soybean growing states). Thus, we choose 
quantities to rule out Bertrand behavior.          9  
 
(oligopsony) equation for a homogeneous product, firm i’s marginal revenue curve is 
given by the degree of market power actually exercised. For oligopoly with (n+1) firms,  
it t i t i it it
it
it q p nv p v q MR
q
R ′ + + = =
∂
∂
) 1 ( ) , ( , 
v=-1/n implies MR=MC,  v=1 implies monopoly (MR=p+p’Q=MC), and v=0 implies 
Nash-Cournot. While in the empirical literature on static models, the parameter v often is 
interpreted as a constant conjectural variation, there is a more neutral interpretation of v 
as a gap between marginal cost and price. In dynamic models, the index is similarly 
defined (as an equilibrium price-cost markup), but it also depends on the shadow value of 
the state, which is endogenous. In our model, we assume Nash-Cournot behavior (v = 0), 
which is consistent with empirical findings about concentrated industries (Gollop and 
Roberts, 1979). 
The two most common structures of dynamic oligopoly games are those of open 
loop and feedback. Under the open-loop structure, the agent’s information set consists of 
calendar time and the state vector in the beginning of the game. The equilibrium is, a 
Nash equilibrium in open-loop strategies. Each firm chooses a sequence of controls (a 
trajectory), which are a function of time and initial state. In other words, each firm 
maximizes its stream of profits given the initial condition, the market power index v, and 
an assumed path of its rivals. Under the assumption of open-loop behavior, the steady 
states for the three leading market structures (competition, Nash-Cournot, and cartel) are 
usually equal to their static analogues.  
Under the feedback  structure, the agent’s information set consists of calendar 
time and value of the current state vector. Strategies map the information set in actions in 
each period. This enables firms to respond to surprises that are caused by additive         10  
 
random shocks from nature. The equilibrium is a set of decision rules rather than a set of 
trajectories in the open-loop game. Players choose state-contingent policy rules, and the 
resulting equilibrium is sub-game perfect. The equilibria are typically not unique (inter 
alia), it can regress to punishment and trigger strategies) and there is no way to identify 
the underlying game by observing market outcomes. 
In standard models (Fudenberg and Tirole, 1984, 1986), both open loop and 
feedback equilibria are obtained by the simultaneous solution to a number of dynamic 
programming equations (equal to the number of firms) representing the value of player 
i’s profits as fuctions of lagged outputs. 
For reasons of tractability, many theoretical and empirical dynamic models 
assume the use of open-loop strategies. There are cases where the open-loop models are 
the same as feedback models and it has been shown that the differences in comparative 
statics with respect to the steady states, as well as in comparative dynamics, are always 
cardinal and never ordinal (Karp and Perloff, 1993). In particular, feedback models 
always lead to more competitive behavior than the open-loop models. This is the result of 
a preemptive incentive that is absent in the open-loop equilibria (Tirole et al, 1986). This 
generalizes the comparative statics for the steady states in two models to entire 
equilibrium paths.  
  In this article, we solve our model as an open-loop game, which does not 
undermine the validity of the parameter sensitivity analysis.  
To show the basic mechanism of the process let us, for a moment, abstract from 
the output demand cross-price elasticities. While little is known about the segregated 
demands for soybean outputs, it is reasonable to assume that the cross-price effects for         11  
 
the products of different “origin” are negligible. Also, the effects of the world demand for 
processing outputs are likely to be weaker than the domestic input supply effects, because 
introduction of GMOs in agriculture is a supply-push process. 
Consider a monopolist’s profit in the crushing industry:  
N G N N G N G G N N N G G G Q Q Q w Q Q Q w Q Q p Q Q p ) , ( ) , ( ) ( ) (
− + − +
− − + = ∏ , 
the first-order derivative with respect to GM crops being: 
4 4 43 4 4 42 1
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where superscripts G and N refer to the GM and traditional (non-GM) crops. Q’s denote 
quantities and p’s prices. This condition corresponds to static profit maximization 
problem, assuming that it is the goal of the corporation.  
The last term in the first-order condition is the cross-price effect stemming from 
the fact that processing more GM output increases the price of GM crop and makes 
growers switch to GM crops thus reducing the price of traditional varieties. 
Let us now consider the possibilities that agricultural producers have of switching 
to/from other crops in response to the soybean price changes. If we treat the environment 
outside the soybean production as static, we should anticipate an increase in the area 
planted with soybeans in response to reduction in the production costs after introduction 
of GM varieties. But when we account for the fact that all the major soybean “competitor 
crops” to which the producers can switch are undergoing similar genetic modifications, 
together with the fact that the structures of markets for corn, rapeseed, canola, sunflower,         12  
 
and other crops are similar to that of soybeans
4, it seems more realistic to assume that no 
substantial increase in the soybean acreage will take place in response to the profitability 
changes. In our model, rather than assuming numerous substitution possibilities or 
considering soybean industry outside of the rest of the agriculture, we resort to simple but 
plausible assumption of constant area planted with soybeans. Because, according to most 
sources, GM soybeans do not exhibit higher yields, this implies that the total soybean 
output remains constant and time-invariant. Defining it as Q





and, maximizing the above profit function with respect to Q
G gives us the condition:  
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which remains the same for each firm in an oligopsonistic processing industry. 
Because we are interested in the diffusion of the GM technology, we consider the 
dynamic aspect of the profit maximization problem. If the processing industry consists of 
n identical firms, each of them maximizes the stream of profits:  
∫
∞
− − − − + =
0






















IP denotes the costs of identity preservation in presence of GM crops. The infinite 
horizon assumption is justified by the fact that it leads to maximizing the value of the 
firm at any point of time.  
  The maximization is subject to the equation for state-dependent GM input price 
                                                 
4 Similar GM varieties are introduced, the structures of the seed and crop processing industries are the 
same, and the end uses of the processed products are similar, too.          13  
 






t w Q w s w − = &  which is consistent with our reasoning about the diffusion 
models, the initial condition 
N
o
G w w = 0 , and the transversality condition. The state is 
wt
G, and firm i’s control is Qit
G, the output of traditional variety being determined by the 
constant planted area assumption condition. wt
G(Qt
G) is the long-run supply equation and 
s is a function of all the exogenous factors influencing adoption behavior. s here denotes 
the speed with which the price converges to its level on the long-run supply equation. 
 While  n defines the number of oligopsonistic firms with Nash-Cournot behavior, 
there may exist a competitive fringe consisting of smaller firms that are price takers and 
behave passively. Because the firms are identical, it can be shown that, provided the 
Hamiltonian for each firm is strictly concave in the control, the equilibrium at any point 
of time is symmetric (Fershtman and Kamien, 1987). Thus, the control of firm i is Qt
Gi ( 
Qt
i to simplify the notation), and: 


















it Q Q Q n Q Q − = − = / . 
The assumption of constant proportions of traditional and GM soybeans for each firm is 
justified by the fact that each firm
5 in the soybean processing has plants and elevators in 
every soybean growing state and therefore complete specialization in GM or traditional 
varieties is unlikely. To make the notation less cluttered, we from now on drop the 
superscripts G from variables pertaining to GM soybeans.   
  Because we are looking for an analytical solution to a dynamic model, we are 
bound to specify the equation of motion in a linear form. We assume it is  
) ( t it t w bnQ a s w − + = & , where  a+bQt is the long-run supply equation.  
                                                 
5 The firms, in this respect, should really be called companies.         14  
 
The price of traditional soybeans, wt







t Q Q b a Q b a w − + = + = , 
where  wt
N  is assumed not to depend on wt  because the cross-price effect is already 
captured by the effect Qt has on Qt
N.  
   The output demands are also assumed to be linear. The demands for GM and non-
GM outputs are the weighted sums of meal and oil demands (the weights are 
technological coefficients of oil and meal production):  
t
G
t Q p β α + = , 
) ( t
T N N N
t
N N N
t Q Q Q p − + = + = β α β α . 







it Q Q p Q p R − + = . 
The costs are similarly defined. Because the soybean processing costs are 
arguably constant, their inclusion does not change the comparable results of the model. 
We thus include only the difference between the costs of processing GM and traditional 
soybeans, which is the costs of identity preservation (IP) that appear immediately after 
GM crops are introduced. Little is known about the IP costs, except that they are 
significant and are likely to be non-linear. The main argument is that, the more GMOs 
there are around, the more thorough the testing and other IP requirements are. The cost of 
identity preservation consists of the cost of checking the non-GM soybeans/meal for the 
presence of GMOs (inspection cost C
I) and the cost of cleaning the storage or processing 
facilities before using them for traditional (non-GM) varieties if GM soybeans have been 
stored or processed there before. The inspection cost is obviously linear in the quantity of 
the non-GM soybeans, but the cleaning cost is a non-linear function of the share of non-        15  
 
GM produce in the total soybean output, typical elevator and crushing plant size, and of 
the efficiency of elevator/processing facilities management. Obviously, production 
management efforts are directed towards specializing production and storage facilities in 
either traditional or GM varieties. But, holding the plant size and the management 
efficiency constant, the costs of cleaning will depend on the frequency of a production 
facility’s switching from GM to non-GM soybeans. Defining by N  the number of 
shipments of non-GM soybeans to an elevator and/or processing facility, the cost of 
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where c
c  is the cost of cleaning a facility and Pr(j, Q
N/Q
GM) is the probability that a 
shipment of non-GM soybeans is received j  times  after  receiving shipment(s) of GM 
varieties. It can be shown that, with uniform distribution of arrivals of non-GM 
shipments, the cleaning cost function is an inverted parabola skewed to the right (see the 
figure below).  
  
  Figure 1. Costs of Identity Preservation 
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C Q C ρ µρ = , where the ρ ’s are the shares of non-Gm and GM  produce, 
respectively, and µ  is a coefficient reflecting the real cost of a one-time cleaning, as well 
as the efficiency of logistics management. Using our notation, the total identity 
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Subtracting the costs from the revenues, applying the symmetry, using the 
assumption of constant total output, and collecting terms yields the objective function of 
firm i:  
4 4 4 4 4 4 4 43 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 42 1
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By definition, the solution to the open-loop oligopsony game with Nash-Cournot 
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Differentiating and substituting produces the following stationary values: 
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with the steady state values of the traditional soybean quantities being determined by the 
model’ specifications.  
The optimization conditions can be differentiated with respect to time and 
rearranged to show that the equilibrium GM input price trajectory must satisfy the 
following second order linear differential equation: 
  F Bw w A w = + + & & & , 
where  
L
r s L sbn as r s sbnK
F
L
r s L rbn sbn
s B
L r A










A particular solution to this equation is F/B which is exactly the stationary 
equilibrium price w
*.  The roots of the characteristic equation associated with the 
homogeneous part of the equation above are both real (this is true since B is negative). If 
we take the stable solution and take the initial price w0 = w0
N, the following is the open-
loop Nash equilibrium trajectory: 
Dt N
t e w w w w ) (
*
0
* − + = , 
where, 0 ) 4 ( 2 / 1
2 < − + − = B A A D . 
As we pointed out earlier, the feedback equilibrium is similar to the open loop and the 
ordinal effects in the model are the same under both structures. For now, we omit the 
simulation with a feedback structure, but the discussion of the comparative dynamics         18  
 
below also pertains to a feedback setup under which, arguably, the oligopsonists behave 
more rationally. 
 
3. Calibration   
In order to show the dynamic properties of the process, we use annual data for 
calibration. The data are obtained from public sources (Soya and Oilseed Bluebook). 
Below are the values of the parameters defined in the previous section. 
 Soybean  supply:  
-  Soybeans used for crushing prior to adoption: Q0
N = 43.5 million metric tons 
(about 60% of the total soybean output) 
-  Traditional soybean price (also the starting value for GM price in the model):       
w0
N = $241 for a metric ton.   
- Area  planted:  L = 28 million hectares 
-  Yield (same for both traditional and GM varieties): y = 2.62 MT/hectare 
- Producer’s cost saving from planting GM in comparison to the traditional variety:  
∆π  = $20/hectare or $7.63/MT (Moschini et al, 2000)  
-  elasticity of planting area with respect to price: ϕ  = 1.2. This measure is rather 
arbitrary stemming from the fact that the existing soybean and oilseed models 
(FAPRI, SWOPSIM, and AGLINK) arguably underestimate soybean elasticities 
(Moschini et al, 2000) assigning them values ranging from .22 to .6.   
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N G a a .         19  
 
For the reasons discussed above, we assume b
G = 1.1 b
N =4.84. 
According to various estimates, the inspection costs range from $0.18 to $0.54 a 
bushel (Lin, 2000). We assume c
I =$1.5/MT. µ  is assumed to be equal to 30.    
  Demand for crushing products: 
For clarity, we have assumed constant prices of outputs. This may be more realistic 
considering the competition that US crushers face in the world markets. But even if the 
industry is facing a residual demand in the output markets the effects of those demands 
must be weaker than those of the domestic soybean supplies.  
-  The transformation coefficients for meal and oil are: γ
M = 0.79 and γ
O = 0.21.  
-  The meal price is the average price in the 1990’s: pM = $219/MT. We assume that 
the price of meal from GM soybeans remains the same.  
-  The oil price is the average price in the 1990’s: pM = $590/MT. We assume that 
the prices after the introduction differ from this level by 5% for oil from 
traditional beans and –10% for oil from GM produce.        
  The output prices in our model are weighted meal and oil prices: 
283 = + = M
M G
O
O G p p p γ γ , and  301 = + = M
M N
O
O N p p p γ γ  
 
4.  Simulation Results  
Because analytical derivatives of the steady states and particularly the trajectories 
with respect to the parameters are hardly tractable, we use numerical estimation results to 
examine the model’s behavior. The software used for the simulation is MATLAB.  
Of special interest is the model’s responsiveness to changes in the number of 
firms in the market. Obviously, both the speed of convergence and the steady states         20  
 
depend on the competitiveness/market power in the processing industry. With the 
assumption of the Nash reasoning, both the equilibrium price and output increase 
together with the increase in the number of firms. The number of firms also influences 
the convergence speed. The table below illustrates: 
 
Stationary Equilibrium Price, Quantity, and Aggregate Crushing Profits with 
Varying Number of Firms (s=0.5, output in millions of metric tons, profits in 
millions of dollars) 
N 1  2 3 10  100 
w
*  134  165 180 207 220 
Q




6375  5913 5465 4216 3401 
 
It is easy to see that, in compliance with the dynamic oligopoly theory with Nash-
Cournot behavior, the market characteristics approach competitive levels as the number 
of firms increase. Profits, however, decline at a lower rate. 
It is hard to compare the convergence periods analytically because the paths only 
asymptotically approach the steady states. Graphically, however, it can be shown that the 
time of convergence to the equilibrium adoption level decreases with the number of 
firms. A picture below illustrates: 
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The speed of supply adjustment, which in our model is caused by the uncertainty 
about GM crops future and producers’ heterogeneity with respect to profitability of the 
GM technology, affects the steady state values of the price, quantity, and of course 
profits. With oligopsony, the higher the adjustment speed parameter s, the lower the 
steady state price and output, and the higher the profits. This trend is observed under 
different number of firms, and both when the starting price is above  the long-run 
equilibrium price (as in our case) and when it is below it. With higher s, however, 
convergence is much faster which the figure below illustrates.  
Stationary Values with Different Speed of Supply Adjustment (n=4, r=0.05) 
S  0.1 0.35  0.5 0.75  0.9 1 
w
*  207 191 188 186 186.5  185 
Q
*  36 33 32.5  32 31.8  31.7 
π
*  4225 5037 5226 5203 5.23  5.25         22  
 
 
Delayed/lagged growers’ responses (which are analogous to sticky prices) appear 
to be an imperfect analogue to “market power” of agricultural producers. In our model, 
uncertainty about the future and additional heterogeneity caused by the GM technology 
prevents producers from reacting perfectly competitively. Instead, they exhibit lagged 
responses to the incentives from the processors (one may say they stick to what they 
have). And, in the post-adoption period, this is also reflected in the fact that the steady 
state price is higher than in the case when they are perfectly responsive. It is easy to see 
that lower prices (lower output) of GM crops reduce the net surplus from the innovation. 
In particular, agricultural producers benefit from higher GMO output (the more GM crop 
is grown, the more costs savings are realized). Our simulation results suggest that, when 
there is uncertainty about GM crops safety and profitability, the growers benefit both in 
the long and short run. The aggregate surplus over the period of adoption, however, may 
not be higher because it takes much longer to converge to equilibrium. At this stage, it is         23  
 
ambiguous whether output/price stickiness related to uncertainty and/or imperfect 
expectations is a good or a bad thing, given there’s market power in the processing. 
Obviously, less market power in processing increases both the price and output and also 
speeds up the transition. And, if we consider GM crops to be something undesirable but 
unavoidable and care about the producers, we should favor a combination of market 
power and the uncertain image of GM foods.  
  From the perspective of the international competitiveness of the U.S., faster 
adoption seems more desirable. The reason is international “spillovers” of agricultural 
innovations, in particular biotechnologies. Biotechnology innovations may be adapted to 
different environments faster than traditional agronomic innovations, for which location-
specificity typically plays an important role (Moschini et al., 2000). Also, biotechnology 
innovations are typically produced by the multinational firms, which are ideally 
positioned for worldwide marketing. Sales of the latest technology by US multinationals 
to countries that export competitive products increases profitability for these firms, but 
undermines US competitiveness in exports of final product. In case of soybeans, higher 
GM technology adoption rates abroad increase cost efficiency of the other major world 
soybean producers, undermining US position in the international soybean market.  
Different interest rates also affect both the speed of convergence and the steady 
state. The higher the interest rate, the shorter the adoption period is and the higher the 
steady state output and price.          24  
 
 
Though we do not solve the feedback form of the model, which assumes slightly 
more realistic firm behavior, theoretically the sensitivity analysis results discussed above 
will be the same, but the steady state values will reflect more competitive behavior. The 
intuition behind this is that the price being higher than its long-run value discourages the 
rivals’ transition to the new technology under the feedback assumptions (which is 
identical to the argument that capacity discourages investment in standard models). 
Therefore, firms have a greater incentive to lose money buying GM produce at a higher 
price and processing it as a means of preempting their rivals’ expansion into the GM 
market, and so they “invest” into GM soybeans now. The incentive is absent from the 
open-loop equilibrium. 
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5. Conclusions 
  In this paper, we developed a dynamic model of adoption of GM soybean 
technology under the assumption of imperfect competition in the soybean processing 
market. The model is specified as a Nash oligoposony situation, where players with 
market power make their output decisions facing a probit structure of adoption by the 
growers and identity preservation requirements  
The simulation results show that market power slows the adoption process, but 
maintains higher level of traditional soybean production. On the other hand, uncertainty 
associated with GM crops and conservative behavior of the growers benefits agricultural 
producers and increases the total surplus in the long run. However the adoption period is 
much longer in this situation, which may undermine the US international 
competitiveness.  
Suggestions for further research include using numerical methods to provide more 
adequate functional forms and game structures to improve the explanatory power of the 
model and exploring the model’s sensitivity to other parameters. The model can also be 
applied to other oligopsonistic markets in agriculture.  
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